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Dizionario gramsciano / Gramsci dictionary: Hegemony
Abstract
Hegemony is by now the most widely used concept of all those found in the Prison Notebooks and developed
there by Gramsci. The first use in the Notebooks occurs very early on, purely in the sense of a political
hegemony exercised by the so-called “Moderates” in the Risorgimento. There is no unique meaning attached
to “hegemony” but an oscillation between a narrow “leadership” as contrasted with “domination” and a
broader one which includes both “leadership” and “domination”, leading the allied classes or groups and
dominating the opposing ones: in Gramsci’s words, the “ ‘normal’ exercise of hegemony” is characterized by a
“combination of force and consent”. Hegemony is exercised across a variety of fields – not solely political as in
the first use of the term, but “political-intellectual”, “intellectual, moral and political”, “politico-cultural” and
“cultural”. And the content of political hegemony “must be predominantly of an economic order”. The
intellectuals, as defined and discussed by Gramsci in the Notebooks, occupy a particular role in the exercise of
hegemony in society by the dominant group and in the domination over society embodied by the State. In a
struggle for hegemony, a subaltern group must go beyond the economic-corporative phase, to advance to
“political-intellectual hegemony in civil society and become dominant in political society”. Hegemony is
intimately connected with democracy, such that in a hegemonic system “there is democracy between the
leading groups and the groups that are led”.
[N.b. All footnotes in Cospito’s contribution are editorial additions; other editorial additions in the text are
given in square brackets, whereas curly brackets are used to indicate the author’s textual abbreviations.]
Keywords
Hegemony, domination, consent, civil society, political society, State.
This journal article is available in International Gramsci Journal: https://ro.uow.edu.au/gramsci/vol3/iss1/7
«International Gramsci Journal», Vol. 3, 2018, n. 1, 18-25. 
ISSN: 1836-6554 






The first occurrence of the lemma “hegemony” appears in 
Q1§44, QdC p. 41 [in English PN Vol. 1, p. 137],1 where we meet 
the expression “ ‘political hegemony’ ”, introduced by Gramsci in 
inverted commas to indicate the particular connotation, as com-
pared with the generic meaning of “pre-eminence”, “supremacy”, 
found when following up after the continuation of the same note, 
ending in the constitution of an extremely broad spectrum of 
meanings in various contexts ranging from the economic to 
literature, from religion to anthropology, from psychology to 
linguistics. We are moreover dealing with distinctions which, to use 
Gramscian terminology, are “methodological” and not “organic” 
(cf. Q13§18, QdC p. 1590 [SPN, p. 160]), as comes over clearly right 
up to the last occurrence of the term (Q29§3, QdC p. 2346): 
  
Every time the question of language surfaces {…} it means that a series of 
other problems are coming to the fore: the formation and enlargement of the 
governing class, the need to establish more intimate and secure relationships 
between the governing groups and the national-popular masses, in other words 
to reorganize the cultural hegemony [SCW, pp. 183-4].  
 
Cultural hegemony which in its turn must not be contraposed to 
political hegemony, as evidenced by the use of expressions such as 
“politico-cultural hegemony”, “political-intellectual” and “intellect-
ual, moral and political” hegemonies, and similar ones, in addition 
to the thesis according to which “the philosophy of praxis con-
ceives the reality of human relationships of knowledge as an ele-
ment of political ‘hegemony’” (Q10II§6, QdC p. 1245 [FSPN, p. 306]).  
                                                 
1 PN will be used to indicate Joseph Buttigieg’s English translation of Gerratana’s Critical 
Edition of 1975 (QdC in the text) for the Columbia University Press, New York (Vols. 1, 2 and 
3 published in 1992, 1996 and 2007 respectively). SPN will be used to refer in the text to 
Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, 1971; SCW for 
Selections from Cultural Writings, ed. D. Forgacs and G. Nowell-Smith, trans. W. Q. Boelhower, 
1985; and FSPN for Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. D. Boothman, , 
1995. The last three volumes are all published in London by Lawrence and Wishart. 





As regards the meaning to be attached to the term “hegemony”, 
from the start (Q1§44, QdC p. 41) Gramsci oscillates between a 
more restricted sense of “leadership”, contraposed to “dom-
ination”, and a broader one that includes both (leadership plus 
domination). Indeed he writes that a  
 
class is dominant in two ways, namely it is “leading” and “dominant”. It 
leads the allied classes, it dominates the opposing classes. Therefore, a class can 
(and must) “lead” even before assuming power; when it is in power it becomes 
dominant but it also continues to “lead” [PN Vol. 1, p. 136-7].  
 
The oscillation continues in the following notes, thereby creating 
not a few difficulties of interpretation, which may be resolved at 
least in part by reference to the context. In Q1§48, QdC p. 59 [PN 
Vol. 1, pp. 155-6], for example a distinction is drawn between the 
“‘normal’ exercise of hegemony on the now classic terrain of the 
parliamentary regime […] characterized by a combination of force 
and consent which balance each other” (hegemony as leadership 
plus domination), and situations in which “the hegemonic 
apparatus cracks and the exercise of hegemony becomes ever more 
difficult” (hegemony vs. domination). Such situations, defined there 
as a “crisis of the principle of authority” - “dissolution of the 
parliamentary regime” and later as an “organic crisis” or explicitly 
as a “crisis of hegemony” (Q13§23, QdC p. 1603 [SPN, p. 210]), 
may be assimilated to those in which the State is not fully 
developed; such was the case of the United States, in which 
(Q1§61, QdC p. 72 [PN Vol. 1, p. 169]) “hegemony is born in the 
factory and does not need so many political and ideological 
intermediaries”, since “there has not yet been (except sporadically, 
perhaps) any ‘superstructural’ blossoming; therefore, the funda-
mental question of hegemony has not yet been posed”. In Q6§10, 
QdC p. 692 [PN Vol. 3, p. 10] Gramsci was to say that “America 
has yet to surpass  overcome the economic-corporative phase, 
which Europe traversed during the Middle Ages”; in Q8§185, QdC 
p. 1053, the judgment is extended to any new State form:  
 
If it is true that no type of State can avoid passing through a phase of 
economic-corporative primitivism, one can deduce that the content of {…} 
political hegemony {…} must be predominantly of an economic order [PN 
Vol. 3, p. 342]. 





The terrain on which the “struggle for hegemony” takes place is 
that of civil society (Q4§46, QdC p. 473 [PN Vol. 2, p. 197]). The 
relation between hegemony and civil society had already been dealt 
with in some detail in Q4§38, pp. 457-60, devoted to the “Relations 
between structure and superstructures”. In this paragraph Gramsci 
distinguishes between three moments: the first is “closely linked to 
the structure”; the second “is the political ‘relation of forces’”; the 
third is the “relation of military forces”. The second moment passes 
through different phases, culminating in the  
 
most patently “political” phase {…} in which previously germinated 
ideologies come into contact and confrontation with one another, until only 
one of them – or, at least, a single combination of them – tends to prevail, to 
dominate, to spread across the entire field, bringing about, in addition to 
economic and political unity, intellectual and moral unity, not on a corporate 
but on a universal level, of hegemony [PN Vol. 2, pp. 179-83]. 
 
At this point the group that up to then had been subaltern can 
leave behind “the economic-corporate phase in order to advance to  
the phase of political-intellectual hegemony in civil society and 
become dominant in political society”. This subject is developed 
especially in Notebook 6 (Q6§24, QdC p. 703 [PN Vol. 3, p. 20 and 
FSPN, p. 75] where Gramsci is at pains to indicate the “sense it 
{civil society} is often used in these notes (that is, in the sense of 
the political and cultural hegemony of a social group over the whole 
of society)”; in Q6§81, QdC p. 751 [PN Vol. 3, p. 64; SPN p. 245], 
even from the title we see the nexus that is formulated between 
Hegemony (civil society) and the separation of powers. In Q7§83, QdC p. 
914 [PN Vol. 3, p. 213], speaking of “what is called ‘public 
opinion’” Gramsci notes that this “is tightly connected to political 
hegemony, in other words it is the point of contact between ‘civil 
society’ and ‘political society’, between consent and force”. As 
compared with the previous identification between hegemony and 
civil society, the apparent contradiction is resolved by taking into 
account the polysemy of the two concepts and that of State: in a 
series of notes, in fact, Gramsci intends “State = political society + 
civil society, that is, hegemony protected by the armor of coercion” 
(Q6§88, 763-4 [PN Vol. 3, pp. 75-6; SPN, p. 262-3]). In another 
group of notes devoted to the critique of Croce’s ethico-political 
history, read as an attempted, albeit partial and unilateral, 





‘translation’ of the concept of hegemony, Gramsci on the other 
hand opposes the excessive contraposition between “the aspect of 
history that is related to ‘civil society’, to hegemony” and “the 
aspect of history related to state-governmental initiative” (Q7§9, 
QdC p. 858 [PN Vol. 3, p. 161]), and insists on hegemony as the 
element that forms the juncture between civil society and political 
society. Moreover, different from Croce, the refusal to contrapose 
the two aspects does not imply their crude identification, as pro-
posed by Gentile, for whom Gramsci claims (Q6§10, QdC p. 691)  
 
hegemony and dictatorship are indistinguishable, force is no different from 
consent; it is impossible to distinguish political society from civil society; only 
the State exists and of course the State-as-government” [PN Vol. 3, p. 10]). 
 
However at the moment when Gentile’s position is unmasked as 
a mere hypostatization of the totalitarian regime imposed by the 
Fascist Party, Gramsci distinguishes between situations in which 
“the given party is bearer of a new culture and one has a progress-
ive phase” from others in which “the party in question wants to pre-
vent another force, bearer of a new culture, from  becoming itself 
‘totalitarian’ – this is an objectively regressive and reactionary phase” 
(Q6§136, QdC p. 800 [PN Vol. 3, p. 108]). The difference between 
fascist totalitarianism and communist totalitarianism consists there-
fore in the fact that while the former tends to reabsorb civil society 
within the State, reducing hegemony to force, in the latter,  
 
it is possible to imagine the State-coercion element withering away grad-
ually, as the increasingly conspicuous elements of regulated society (or ethical 
State or civil society) assert themselves. {…} In the theory of the State → 
regulated society (from a phase in which State equals Government to a phase in 
which State is identified with civil society), there must be a transition phase of 
the State as night watchman, that is of a coercive organization that will protect 
the development of those elements of regulated society that are continually on 
the rise and, precisely, because they are on the rise, will gradually reduce the 
State’s authoritarian and coercive interventions  
 
up to “an era of organic freedom” (Q6§88, QdC p. 763-4 [PN Vol. 3, 
pp. 75-6; SPN, p. 263]). Starting from Q6§138, QdC p. 802 [PN Vol. 
3, p. 109], Gramsci describes the long struggle to install this new 
model of social organization with the concept of the war of position, 
which requires “an unprecedented concentration of hegemony”. In 
Q8§52, QdC p. 973 [PN Vol. 3, p. 266], this strategy is contraposed 





to Trotsky’s strategy of the permanent revolution: the “1848 con-
cept of the war of movement is precisely the concept of permanent 
revolution: in politics the war of position is the concept of hegemony”. 
As for the protagonists of this war, in the initial stage of 
Gramsci’s prison reflections, his attention seems centred on the 
class. In Q1§44, QdC p. 40 we read that  
 
the whole problem of the various political currents of the Risorgimento 
{…} is reducible to the following basic fact: that the Moderates represented a 
relatively homogeneous class, and therefore their leadership underwent 
relatively limited oscillations, whereas the Action Party did not found itself 
specifically upon any historical class and the oscillations which its leading 
organs  underwent resolved themselves, in the last analysis, according to the 
interests of the Moderates [PN Vol. 1, p. 136].  
 
This is a vision that, in presupposing a somewhat mechanical 
nexus between the structure and the superstructure, would reduce 
the struggle for hegemony to an epiphenomenon of the class 
struggle on the terrain of the relations of production. Afterwards, 
Gramsci would attenuate this rigidity, writing in Q6§200, QdC pp. 
839-40 that in  
 
the development of a national class, one must take into account not only the 
process of its formation within the economic sphere, but also its parallel growth 
in the ideological, juridical, religious, intellectual, philosophical, spheres etc. 
{…}. Still every movement that is the bearer of a ‘thesis’ leads to movements of 
‘antithesis’ and {then} to partial and provisional ‘syntheses’ [PN Vol. 3, p. 143].  
 
In the meantime Gramsci had developed a further agent of hege-
monic influence, represented by the intellectual. Already tangible as 
from the note of Q1§44, QdC p. 41 [PN Vol. 1, p. 137], where the 
leaders of the moderate party were defined as “organic intellectuals” 
or “condensed” ones, a “vanguard” of their own class; as from 
Q4§49 (QdC pp. 474-84 [PN Vol. 2, p. 199-210]) the weight of the 
intellectuals assumes a notable increase equally with the extension of 
the concept itself, up to the point of including not only professional, 
industrial, scientific, ecclesiastical, clerical intellectuals and so on, 
concluding in the second draft (Q12§1, QdC p. 1516 [SPN, p. 9]) 
that “all men are intellectuals”, even though “not all men have in 
society the function of intellectuals”. As from the A text [a first 
draft text – tr. note] of Q4§49, QdC p. 476, Gramsci attributes to 
the intellectuals  





a function in the ‘hegemony’ that is exercised through-out society by the 
dominant group and in the “domination” over society that is embodied by the 
State and this function is precisely “organizational” or “connective” [PN Vol. 
2, p. 200].  
 
The study of the role of the intellectuals as “functionaries” or, as 
he was to say in the C text, [the second draft text – tr. note] (Q12§1, 
QdC p. 1519 [SPN, p. 12]) “the dominant group’s ‘deputies’ 
exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political 
government”, involves going into detail into another subject 
sketched out in Q1, viz. hegemonic apparatuses or systems: first of all this 
means the scholastic system in the broadest meaning of the term, 
from the moment when (Q10II§44, QdC p. 1331 [SPN, p. 350]) 
“every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogical 
relationship”; thus, journalistic undertakings, the legal organizations 
– repressive and non-repressive – but also, as noted in Q8§179, QdC 
p. 1049 [PN Vol. 3, p. 338}, “numerous other so-called private 
initiatives and activities” including “charitable institutions and 
legacies to charity” (Q14§56, QdC p. 1715 [FSPN, p. 154}). The 
progressive loss of importance of class, compared to intellectuals, in 
the exercise of hegemony, to be correlated to his frequent 
substitution of ‘group’ or ‘social grouping’ (e.g. in his rewritten 
version of Q1§44 (QdC pp. 40-54 [PN Vol. 1, pp. 136-54]) in 
Q19§24 ({QdC esp. pp. 2010-11} [SPN, esp. pp. 57-9]), makes it 
possible to establish a less mechanical connection between the 
economic plane and the hegemonic one; it is indeed true, as one 
reads in Q4§49, QdC pp. 474-6, that  
 
every social group, coming into existence on the primal basis of an essential 
function in the world of economic production creates together with itself, 




the relationship between the intellectuals and production is not as direct as 
in the case of the fundamental social groups, but mediated {…} by two types 
of social organization: (a) by civil society {…} {and} (b) by the State  
 
as well as by the existence of “pre-existing categories of 
intellectuals” which represent “a historical continuity uninterrupted 





even by the most complicated changes of social and political 
forms” [PN Vol. 2, pp. 199 and 200]2.  
One must, moreover, consider the progressive emergence, start-
ing with Q5§127, QdC p. 662 [PN Vol. 2, p. 382}, of the role of the 
party understood as the “modern Prince”, from the moment that 
“in reality in certain States, the ‘head of State’ {…} is precisely the 
‘political party’” which holds “de facto power”, and exercises the hege-
monic and thus the equilibrating function between different interests 
in “civil society”. The party presents itself as the bearer of a new 
model of substantial democracy, different from the previous one, if 
not totally antithetic as compared with the formal parliamentary one, 
as is demonstrated in a series of late notes in which this latter is re-
valued in contraposition to tacit or implicit “black parliamentar-
ism”, represented by fascist corporativism but which may also be 
imputed to Stalin’s regime (“the self-criticism of self-criticism”, the 
“liquidation” of Trotsky and so on: Q14§74 and Q14§76), in which 
it is clear that “care must be taken to exclude the slightest appear-
ance of support for ‘absolutist’ tendencies” [SPN, pp. 255-7].3 This 
allows Gramsci to create a nexus (Q8§191, QdC p. 1056) between  
 
Hegemony and Democracy. Among the many meanings of democracy, the most 
realistic and concrete one, in my view, is that which can be brought into relief 
through the connection between democracy and the concept of hegemony. In 
the hegemonic system, there is democracy between the leading groups and the 
groups that are led [PN Vol. 3, p. 345; see also SPN, footnote on p. 56]. 
 
This is the particular meaning attached by Gramsci to 
“democratic centralism”, which “consists in a critical research […] 
to separate out the ‘international’ and ‘unitary’ element in national 
and localistic reality” (Q9§68, QdC, p. 1140).4 Gramsci returns to 
this nexus between the national and international elements in 
paragraphs leading up to Q14§68, QdC p. 1729 [SPN, pp. 240-41]: 
“To be sure, the line of development is towards internationalism, 
but the point of departure is ‘national’ {…}. It is in the concept of 
hegemony that those exigencies are knotted together”. 
                                                 
2 Readers may wish to compare this with its well-known second draft in Q12§1 that begins 
the text of the SPN volume (pp. 5-7).  
3 Here, in line with the manuscript of the Quaderni, the plural “tendencies” is written, rather 
than the singular of the SPN translation. 
4 Cf. the second draft of this passage, included with rewrites of other previous paragraphs, 
now in Q13§36 (SPN, pp. 185-90: here pp. 189-90). 





The centrality of the role of the party in the struggle for hegemony 
makes the relationship between the structural plane and the super-
structural ones less mechanical; moreover, as from Q7§24, QdC p. 
871, Gramsci has recourse precisely to the concept of hegemony to 
combat  
 
the assumption (put forward as an essential postulate of historical material-
ism) that one can present and explain every political and ideological fluctuation 
as a direct expression of the structure [PN Vol. 3, p. 173].  
 
From this stems the critique of any economistic interpretation of 
historical materialism, which becomes ever more stringent as 
Gramsci realizes how widespread this is and what sort of obstacle it 
represents on the way towards the attainment of ideological 
hegemony by the philosophy of praxis. Different, for example, 
from the claim in Q4§14, QdC p. 436, that “historical materialism is 
not subjected to hegemonies, it has itself started to exercise a 
hegemony over the old intellectual world” [PN Vol. 2, p. 156], in 
Q16§9, QdC p. 1860-61 – in an innovation as compared with the 
first draft text of Q4§3 – Gramsci here instead recognizes that this  
 
is the conception of a subaltern social group, deprived of historical 
initiative, in continuous but disorganised expansion, unable to go beyond a 
certain qualitative level, which still remains below the level of the possession of 
the State and of the real exercise of hegemony over the whole of society [SPN, 
p. 396]. 
 
It is not, then, for Gramsci a question of going beyond the 
horizon of Marxism, so much as returning to the original sources: 
hence the attribution, beginning with Q4§38, p. 465 [PN Vol. 2, p. 
187], of the paternity of the very concept of hegemony, which 
indeed represents “Ilyich’s greatest contribution to Marxist philo-
sophy, to historical materialism: an original and creative contri-
bution”. And it is precisely through Lenin that Gramsci returns to 
Marx: in Q10II§41X, QdC p. 1315, again with an innovation as 
compared with the first draft text, he in fact writes that already in 
Marx there is “contained in a nutshell the ethico-political aspect of 
politics or theory of hegemony and consent, as well as the aspect of 
force and of the economy” [FSPN, p. 399].5 
                                                 
5 The last word in the original (economia) could also be interpreted “economics”, in the sense 
of subjection to “economic laws”, the choice which was made in FSPN. 
